Foundational approach to utilitarianism

Utilitarianism apparently looks at things from the angle of weighing benefits against cost and thus avoiding things that cost too much or provide insufficient benefit.

Contemporary attempts to “use” a utilitarist’s angle for one’s own benefit, for one’s own cynicism, for one’s own advantage, may fall short of what utilitarianism really was, should have been and still might be. In more detail, some of utilitarianism’s contemporary variations’ aspects seem to feel void, empty, the concept feels like an air balloon – ready to pop any time and go pffffrrr – just after reading over recent jabs at the subject. Like, I mean, if you read about Peter Singer and his infanticide proposals ¹, you know it feels wrong, and they call that also utilitarianism. From my view, that may be everything and anything, but it is most certainly not maximizing pleasure, but instead a focus on reducing pain, which is also decidedly different – rather, this seems to be an agonizing position from start to end. Katie Booth’s 2018 essay about Singer and disability exposes a deeper problem that I want to pursue here: disabled lives risk to be assessed by criteria imposed by people who do not experience those lives. With that, I feel as if a few steps back into the actual origins of utilitarianism was in order: who figured utilitarianism out first, and what may have gotten lost on the way? What was utilitarianism meant to be, before it became that? 

As it is, according to Brian Duignan’s understanding of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (apparently both hedonists, that allegedly believed only pleasure rather than pain was of intrinsic value),  under their normative ethics, an action is right if it promotes happiness or pleasure, and wrong if it produces unhappiness or pain – both in the short and long term, as well as considering all rather than just some angles of a particular issue. And yet we are left with some pressing questions, such as just who gets to decide such things, who is concerned and who is not. Dewey, in The Public and Its Problems (1927), Chapter VI, p. 208, warns: “No government by experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs”. He concludes that such government becomes an oligarchy serving the interests of the few.

An action is assumedly right under the light of a coarsely defined utilitarian view if it promotes happiness also regardless – to a degree, certainly not by all means, by clearly illegal means, or by immoral means – of the path taken, of the way that goal is reached.

Utilitarianism is therefore a form of consequentialism that evaluates actions on basis of (all of) their consequences, most notably those that increase pleasure and happiness for those that are concerned or affected. In that, they assumedly are different from egoism (whereas a person acts in self-interest even at the expense of others), and an opposite to any ethical theories that regard actions right or wrong independently of their consequences.

To recap, and to make sure we understand the same as the original authors: the path is correct, and to be chosen, if it promotes happiness. It is wrong if it produces unhappiness, suffering or pain.

Mill himself posits that [1]:

“Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.

By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question.

But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded—namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.

(..)

There is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.

(..)

It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.

If I am asked, what I mean by the difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer.

Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.  If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account. Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties.

(..)

From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity. 

(…)

The [utilitarian] standard [of what is good because it achieves happiness] is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit. (…) ”

(red highlights by me)

Discussion

Who gets to decide over a particular aspect?

What Mill himself clearly states with regard to who gets to decide, is, that the ones to decide over a particular preference are those with experience of both, or, all options that are up for consideration; this should exclude bystanders and outsiders from the process on basis of a comm0nsensical absence of subject-related competence.

The key question I found out when reading such claims is “from what angle”, who gets to sit on the throne here to define all the specifics.

Who gets their say in what to maximize just how?²

As already posted, Mill literally and verbatim explicitly states “Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure”. This means, in other words, or rephrasing this, that explicitly, the decision about what does or does not constitute a more desirable pleasure in any situation of two alternatives, irrespective of moral obligation, is to be made by all or almost all those people that have experience of both alternatives. It is not stated but also meant that people that have no own explicit and practical experience in both alternatives are not the onces to chime in, voice, express and otherwise impose their preference. They may have a preference but it is not theirs to give.

Mill further literally states ” If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.” So he repeats that the value, the significance, regarding which is the best alternative, is to be made by those that are competently acquainted with both alternatives.

Mill then reiterates and emphasizes again that “From this verdict of the only competent judges (…) the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final.” With that he defines competence of the judges implicitly as being qualified by knowledge of both alternatives that are up for decision. He also restricts the competence of decision making to those that are privileged to own knowledge of both alternatives, and implicitly excludes all others. 

In summary, Mill does not leave the question of who gets to decide open.

Mill clearly privileges those that (a) have actual exposure and experience and also (b) are competently acquainted with both, not just one, alternative, to say and have a final decision about which one is the better under the guiding principle of utilitarianism. Indeed, the second qualification strengthens the first: mere familiarity or theoretical knowledge is not the same as competent acquaintance with both alternatives. Both are a necessary and required aspect. Mill does not leave open who is qualified to determine which of two pleasures is more desirable. He explicitly identifies those who have experienced both alternatives as the competent judges.

There are three important elements in these quoted passages.

1. Own practical exposure and experience is a sine qua non qualification for utilitarian judgment. Mill does not assign equal authority to everyone who happens to have an opinion. He clearly and exclusively privileges people acquainted with both pleasures being compared.

2. The judgment is comparative. Knowing only one alternative is insufficient to establish its superiority over another. The relevant competence comes from having experienced both.

3. The judgment is not supposed to be dictated by moral obligation. Mill explicitly says that the preference must be established independently of any felt moral duty to prefer one pleasure over the other.

Mill specifies whose judgment determines the comparative desirability of pleasures. That however is not necessarily identical to specifying who has the political, legal, or moral authority to choose an action affecting multiple people. In other words, political power may still lie elsewhere and in that it may distort, confound or dilute any utilitarian purity.

So that distinction does not weaken my central point in argument whereas outsiders who presume to assess other people’s experiences are not included in Mill’s original wording with regard to utilitarianism. On the contrary, Mill supplies a strong argument against their presumed competence.

This establishes something stronger than merely giving experienced people greater weight in a discussion. Mill establishes an exclusive standard of competence for determining the comparative experiential value of two pleasures. The relevant final judgment only belongs to those acquainted with both (or all) alternatives that are up for discussion. The opinion of someone who lacks such acquaintance does not enjoy the same authority, or any authority, considering these requirements, regardless of that person’s intellectual standing, professional position, or theoretical sophistication. Moreover, Mill extends this reasoning beyond pleasure to the comparison of different modes of existence.

One qualification remains important. Mill explicitly limits this particular comparison to the experiential merits of the alternatives, considered apart from their moral attributes and consequences. Hence it does not automatically settle the separate question of who may legitimately impose a decision affecting others. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy likewise interprets Mill’s qualitative ranking of pleasures in terms of the judgments of those who have experienced and appreciated the alternatives being compared.

Mill’s utilitarianism thus contains a clear epistemic restriction on who can authoritatively determine the quality of a pleasurable experience.

He assigns that judgment to persons competently acquainted with the alternatives, explicitly denying any further appeal from their verdict. This makes an important if not massive difference to modern attempts to justify decisions by invoking a supposedly objective assessment of other people’s welfare.

Where the experiential quality of a life, condition, or activity is at issue, the judgments of those with relevant first-hand experience cannot simply be replaced by the theoretical evaluations of outsiders without departing from Mill’s stated method of evaluating pleasures.

The distinction is not merely between subjective and objective assessments. It is between judgments grounded in comparative experience and judgments made without that experience.

Any subsequent criticism of modern objectification can legitimately begin there. Its next step—arguing that experiential competence should confer decisive authority over the resulting practical decision—is a further ethical and political argument, rather than a conclusion established by these passages alone.

Clearly, Mill meant a utilitarian decision over an action or activity to be a decision for the better one from view of, enacted by, carried out by people that were actively involved, and thoroughly competent through own exposure and experience, and the scope of “happiness” clearly included moral sentiments – maybe without making this an obsessive requirement. In no way did he mean this to be a thought experiment for cynical armchair philosophers – no, utilitarianism started as a practitioner guide for the bruised and exposed, for the unabashed and ever returning experience seekers. Also, any lowly physical pleasure was not a focus for what was sought by happiness, instead, nobleness of character appeared as a requirement for what Mills expected utilitarian decision competence to require.

Who gets to define the weight of single aspects in trading off good against bad?

Furthermore, the single aspect weights may be a powerful determinant of an outcome in utilitarian decisions or trade-offs. As that seems to be a subspecification of the “Who gets to decide” question, best to ask it there.

Can the difference in advantage or improvement be marginal or little between what is compared, or is there a set minimal difference?

According to Mills, the difference between the better option and the lesser one has to be so considerable that also any disadvantages do not put a shadow of doubt over that preference. This may mean reversely put, if there is a shadow of doubt and differences between options are marginal, minimal, we maybe should not really look at utilitarianism, as decision basis.

What all counts as action, and what counts as consequences of the action – its goal, its end, its intended “pleasure”, and how far do we count reverberations and remote effects?

This is really a more explosive question than meets the eye, really. Is absence of action also considered? Is the explicit focus of an action the focus of all considerations – or do we look further? Do the consequences of these actions also extend to other people, people later, people outside of the circle of the active players? What may be considered as the intended outcome, consequence, goal, end? If it is the observation of a particular rule, how is utilitarianism then different from a deontological approach? How conversely can the consequences of an action be rated under a utilitarian view, in absence of considering also its rule-compliance as one of its undebatable consequences? How narrow-minded does one’s vision have to be in order to call it utilitarian? Or are all other methods of looking at consequences of actions utilitarian no matter what – while differing just in how much one or the other outcome is weighed against another, which seems to be an issue that Bentham then described? Where and how is utilitarianism distinct? If the way how the consequence of an action is reached ostensibly is not considered, what with approaches such as “the path is the goal”? Can a path-is-goal oriented person still be a utilitarian?

How do we go about tethered negative-positive goal pairs in a tightly knit society? How is the greatest amount of happiness altogether measured, observed, registered?

If one group goal can be positively reached only if another group suffers, a utilitarian approach is anything but clear right from its outset: is the goal only that one group that gets to win? Is the goal reversable so the group that risks to lose first now gets to win as sole measure of utilitarian success? Is there a majority or representative vote? Can people vote that are unaffected by the outcome? Or is the goal that all groups are maximally happy? If all groups can live a life according to some minimal standard, can that be defined as goal and utilitarian-ness be fulfilled by canceling all above that level for simplicity and cost saving?

If the greatest amount of happiness is to be identified, it seems unclear how to do that.

Summary

Mill’s original formulation of utilitarianism contains a remarkably explicit restriction on the competence to judge the comparative desirability of pleasures and modes of existence. Such judgments are not left to everyone who happens to possess an opinion, professional authority, or philosophical sophistication. Mill assigns them to those competently acquainted with both alternatives. Their majority judgment is final, and he explicitly denies the existence of a superior tribunal.

This creates an epistemic restriction on the authority to define what constitutes a desirable experience. An outsider’s theoretical assessment cannot simply substitute for the judgment of those possessing the relevant comparative experience.

However, the authority to determine experiential desirability must be distinguished from the political or legal authority to impose a particular course of action. Mill’s arguments concerning individual liberty provide an additional basis for resisting paternalistic decisions made in the supposed interests of others.

The distinction becomes particularly consequential when utilitarian reasoning is applied to disability, medical decisions, social policy, or the evaluation of human lives. Here, an individual’s own account of their experiences may be displaced by externally constructed criteria of welfare, with those exercising power assuming the authority to define what constitutes a desirable life.

The problem is not simply whether the calculation is correct. It is whether the people performing the calculation possess the knowledge required to make it, whether its criteria adequately represent the experiences being evaluated, and whether they have any legitimate authority to impose the resulting judgment.

Thus, an appeal to the greatest happiness may conceal two fundamentally different enterprises: attempting to understand and improve the lives of those concerned, or asserting the authority to determine, without adequate experiential knowledge, what those lives ought to be.

The critical question is therefore not merely how to maximize utility, but who is qualified to define it, who has the authority to act upon that definition, and whose interests may be sacrificed in the process.

@book{mill2004utilitarianism,
  title={Utilitarianism},
  author={Mill,John Stuart},
  year={1863},
}